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Riots against the Non-Muslims of
Turkey: 6/7 September 1955 in the
context of demographic engineering
Dilek Güven
 
The Policy of national Homogenisation from the
1910’s to the 1940’s.
1 From 1913 to 1914, the national question entered a new era in the Ottoman Empire. The
defeat in the Balkan War of 1912 had been attributed chiefly to an inchoate national
consciousness, and the outbreak of the First World War was seen as an opportunity to put
a new national program into effect. One of the most important steps taken in this context
was  revoking  the  system  of  capitulations,  which  was  the  legal  ground  for  granting
Europeans privileges such as diplomatic immunity, tax exemption, lower rates of custom
duties and the right to establish their own postal services. In addition, making Turkish
compulsory  in  economic  transactions  paved the  way  for  replacing  employees  in  the
public sector who were predominantly Christian by their Muslim counterparts. Thus the
conditions that would facilitate the emergence of a “national bourgeoisie” were created.
2 The concern for homogenising Asia Minor, which was the nucleus of the multi-ethnic
empire, was also ethnically and demographically interrelated with the aforementioned
issue. Demographic engineering was seen as a necessary precondition for establishing a
triumphant  nation-state.  The  settlement  policy  of  1912-1923  regarding  the  Greek-
Orthodox population of  Asia Minor and the deportation and killing of  the Armenian
population should primarily be considered outcomes of the homogenising attempts that
were accomplished in the axis of nation-state. 
3 Discrimination against non-Muslim and non-Turkish ethnic groups intensified after the
formation of the Republic in 1923. Although the recently established state guaranteed the
autonomy of minorities within the framework of international law, the governments of
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the 1920s and 1930s explicitly pursued policies of assimilation from time to time. If the
rights  and  obligations  of  all  citizens  before  the  laws  seemed  formally  identical,  in
everyday life, belongingness to the dominant Turkish ethnic identity formed the basis of
the state’s identity policy. The intention of these practices was to accelerate the processes
of nation-state formation, modernisation and westernisation.
4 The state’s identity policy manifested primarily in the domain of national education. The
significant decrease in the number of minority schools, the requirement that Turkish be
the language of  instruction and those schools’  subjection to the Ministry of  National
Education’s  arbitrary  monitoring  were  keystones  in  the  Turkification  process  of  the
educational institutions belonging to non-Muslim communities.
5 Turkification in the educational domain was supported considerably by the economic
measures by which the state attempted to create a “national bourgeoisie.” To this end,
the  Turkish  National  Commercial  Union,  whose  members  were  also  deputies  in  the
Turkish Grand National Assembly, was established in 1923. With the help of both the
Turkish Government and the newly established commercial union, it was expected that
Turkish  businessmen would  acquire  a  secure  position in  the  country’s  financial  and
banking sectors. The union was also influential in acquiring the enterprises which used to
belong to the Greek-Orthodox who left Istanbul. Moreover, under certain circumstances,
Greek-Orthodox people were purposely intimidated so that  they would emigrate and
their property could be purchased at very low prices. However, the Turkification of the
economy was not limited to the commercial sector. For example, employees in foreign
firms were to be replaced by Turkish employees. Until 1923, 90 % of the administrative
and office posts in foreign firms were filled by non-Muslims.1 In a short while, the Turkish
government started to pressure foreign enterprises in Istanbul to transfer all posts to
Muslims. Especially the political measures that government had taken with respect to the
economy reveal that the Turkish ethnic identity was thought as the basic component of
demonstration for republic. 
6 In addition to the assimilation of minorities, migration and settlement policies were other
means to create ethno-cultural unity within the borders of the newly established state.
For  instance,  between the  years  1929  and  1934,  the  local  administrations  compelled
Armenians  who  were  living  in  the  rural  areas  of  Asia  Minor  to  migrate  into  urban
centres.The secret agents of the Turkish government inculcated Armenians in Anatolia,
especially those in Diyarbakır and Harput, with the idea that leaving Turkey would be for
“their well-being.” The Armenians were assured that if they emigrated, their properties
would be bought  in accordance with the regulations,  and that  they would leave the
country without any difficulty.Between the years 1928-1929, the Armenians of Sivas were
prohibited to leave the provincial borders. At the same time, since the opportunities for
employment  were  also  taken  away,  economic  problems  caused  the  majority  of  the
Armenians themselves  to ask permission from the government to leave the country.
Particularly at  the level  of  local  administrations,  there was a  noteworthy interest  in
buying the properties of the Armenian minority at very low prices to boost the wealth of
the  ethnically  Turkish.According  to  the  account  of  the  officials  of British  Consulate,
nearly the majority of  well-to do Armenians in Sivas left  the city,  and the economic
activities of the remaining ones were of quite limited by the middle of 1929.2
7 Armenian peasants living in the countryside, on the other hand, were forced to move into
big  cities  or  central  or  eastern  districts  of  the  country.  This  involuntary  internal
migration had many “advantages” for the Turkish government: In many cases, Armenians
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who were  used to  living in  rural  settings  could  not  make a  living  in  the  cities  and
therefore emigrated to Syria; in addition, controlling and monitoring them became easier
once they were concentrated in smaller areas.  Thus the regions that were cleared of
Armenians were offered to the new Turkish settlers, especially from the Balkans. 
8 Nearly  six  months  prior  to  the  implementation  of  the  Settlement  Law,  Anatolian
Armenians were subject to a new migration wave. In early 1934, six hundred Armenians,
deported from various cities and rural areas to Istanbul within a period of two months,
were settled in Armenian churches and schools and in deserted houses in Yeniköy and
Ortaköy.3
9 During  the  years  prior  to  their  deportation,  Armenians  were  suppressed  by  local
administrations so that the forced nature of their exile from Anatolia could be concealed.
Turkish police initially tried to provoke local Muslims against Armenians so that it would
appear that the local inhabitants had expelled the “infidels.” This attempt, however, was
unsuccessful.  Subsequently,  the  government  settled the émigrés  from the Balkans  in
Armenian settlements and warned the Armenians that their properties could be handed
over  to  the  newcomers.  When  instead  a  peaceful  relationship  arose  in  between
Armenians  and the  Balkan émigrés,  the  Armenians  were  told  to  move  into  Istanbul
immediately.4 In order to prevent the indictments that the state was confiscating the
properties of Armenians, they were allowed to sell their possessions. Nevertheless, the
prices offered for these possessions were so low that there was practically no difference
between confiscation and selling. The rural Armenian groups mostly migrated to Syria as
a result of not being able to adapt themselves to the urban areas they settled in. 5
10 The pogrom-like attacks which were organised against Jews with the participation of
state authorities in 1930s should also be considered in this context. Some of the Jews
living in the cities in Thrace were intimidated through threats and economic boycotts.
During the summer of  1934,  shops,  workplaces and residences of  Jews were attacked
(Aktar 2000 ; Bali 1999).
11 The extraordinary Wealth Tax that was approved by the National Assembly in 1942 aimed
to eradicate the pioneering role that Armenians, Greek Orthodox and Jews had had in the
economy. This tax was so excessive in many cases that it was impossible to pay even if
they had sold all their possessions (Ökte 1987). 
 
The narrative of the events of 6-7 September 1955.
12 On 6September 1955 at 13.00,  Turkish state radio announced that a bomb attack had
taken place at the house in Thessalonica where Atatürk was born, and this news spread
out with two different afternoon copies of the newspaper İstanbul Ekspres.  Late in the
afternoon on the same day, a public demonstration was organised in Taksim Square by
various  student  associations,  unions  and  the  “Association  of  Turkish  Cyprus”  (KTC).
Following  this  demonstration,  groups  started  stoning  the  windows  of  shops  and
businesses that belonged to non-Muslims. In a short while, clusters of people equipped
with tools to destroy houses, shops, churches and schools rushed into neighbourhoods
around  Taksim  such  as  Beyoğlu,  Kurtuluş,  Şişli,  Nişantaşı,  which  were  traditionally
known as non-Muslim residential and business districts.6 In a similar manner, acts of
violence  took  place  in  remoter  districts  of  Istanbul  such  as  Eminönü,  Fatih,  Eyüp,
Bakırköy, Yeşilköy, Ortaköy, Arnavutköy, and Bebek, in addition to Asian quarters such as
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Moda,  Kadıköy,  Kuzguncuk,  Çengelköy,  and on the Prince Islands.It  is  estimated that
approximately one hundred thousand people took part in these attacks.7
13 The assaults were carried out by organised units consisting of twenty to thirty people
who can be subdivided into provocateurs,  leaders,  and destroyers.  In many cases the
provocateurs carried Turkish flags, or busts and photos of Atatürk and Celal Bayar. They
also distributed KTC badges and rosettes and appealed to people to identify their homes,
shops and cars with Turkish flags. 
14 The duty of the group leaders, first of all, was to identify the objects that were to be
damaged. They approached their task methodically. Some of the group leaders carried
lists of the home and work addresses of non-Muslims. A week before the events took
place, the headmen of the involved neighbourhoods were asked to provide home and
work addresses of non-Muslim minorities. According to a report prepared by the French
Consulate, the addresses of non-Muslim minorities were determined by a special unit as
early as the Second World War so that in case of an encounter, their “neutralisation”8
would be easier. The report also revealed that the rioters were able to utilise the already
registered addresses and information. Just before the uprisings, the watchmen requested
some residents to indicate the door numbers of their homes and shops. Some non-Muslim
homes and shops were distinguished with crosses, abbreviations like NMG (Non-Muslim
Greek),  or  descriptions  such  as  “non-Turkish”  or  “Turkish.”9 The  third  division,  the
destroyers, destroyed the pre-determined objects with stones, cranks, wooden boards,
shovels, handsaws and welding machines.The necessary tools were kept ready at central
points inside the city or at bus stops prior to the attacks.
15 Furthermore, the mobilisation of the perpetrators and their equipment inside the city
was guaranteed by a transportation network composed of private cars, commercial taxis
and trucks, ferries and even military vehicles.The rioters thus easily determined their
targets and accomplished their attacks successfully throughout the city.
16 The vandalism followed the  same procedure  all  over  the  city.  In  the  case  of  shops,
assailants initially destroyed the shop windows with stones, or opened the iron banisters
with the help of welding machines or wire scissors. Then, goods and possessions inside
the shop, or the equipments and machinery if the place was a workshop, were destroyed,
either inside or just outside on the street. 
17 The churches were also affected by the assaults. The holy images, crosses, icons and other
sacred possessions inside the churches were either destroyed or burnt,  or the whole
church was set on fire. Greek-Orthodox cemeteries in Şişli and Balıklı were particularly
damaged. The assailants not only tore down the epitaphs, but also took out the skeletons,
which were either burnt or broken.10
18 The police  officers  not only  confirmed their  sympathy to  the  movement  during  the
demonstration in  Taksim,  but  also  tended to  remain passive  when public  order  was
broken and violence occurred.In some districts of Istanbul, security forces did not leave
their premises even when they had witnessed violence.According to reports prepared by
German Consulate-General, the passivity of the police forces was “the result of not an
official  order,  but  an  instruction  which  principally  made  room for  disregarding  the
events.”11 Another crucial point was that the fire brigades were late to attend the places
set on fire, or remained passive, claiming that their equipment was inadequate.
19 Depending on the source that  is  taken as  a  chief  reference,  one can reach different
conclusions about the harm caused by the uprisings. According to an official Turkish
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source,  4,214  houses,  1,004  workplaces,  73  churches,  1  synagogue,  2  monasteries,  26
schools,  and  5,317  other  establishments  such  as  factories,  hotels,  pubs,  etc.,  were
attacked.12
20 According to an American source, 59 % of the attacked workplaces, and 80 % of damaged
houses, belonged to Greek-Orthodox. Seventeen % of all assaulted workplaces and 9 % of
all damaged houses belonged to Armenians. In addition to these, 3 out of 33 Armenian
churches and 4 out of 22 Armenian schools were attacked. 12 % of all attacked workplaces
and 3 % of all destroyed houses belonged to Jewish residents according to this source.13
21 It is probable that the mob leaders had been instructed to not engage in theft, since there
were crucially few cases of theft during the first wave of rioting. The sentries located at
important crossroads checked whether pedestrians were carrying any stolen items.
22 The number of  reported injuries fluctuates between 300 and 600,  but those numbers
include not only victims, but also injured perpetrators.14 It can also be argued, given the
small number of injuries and deaths compared to the destruction caused by the attacks,
that  an instruction prohibiting corporeal  injury was given.  During the attacks,  some
perpetrators informed the inhabitants in a calming manner that they would only cause
material damage, and they were given orders only to destroy.
23 In  household  attacks,  Greek-Orthodox  women  in  particular  were  raped.  The  Chief
Physician  of  Balıklı  Hospital  reported  that  60  Greek-Orthodox  women  were  treated
accordingly.15 If we assume that many rape victims concealed what had happened and
avoided medical  care,  it  can be claimed that  the actual  number of  rape victims was
higher.
24 The number of deaths is uncertain; in the Turkish press it was reported that between 11
and 15 people died.16 According to records of the German Consulate General, economic
losses amounted to approximately 150 million Turkish Liras (TL), an amount equal to the
value of  54 million US Dollars in that  period.  28 million TL of  this  financial  damage
belonged to  Greek  citizens,  68  million  TL  to  Greek-Orthodox citizens  of  the  Turkish
Republic, 35 million TL to churches, and 18 million TL to foreigners and other minorities
(Armenians and Jews) respectively.17
25 After  the  violence  was  suppressed,  on  9  September  1955  the  Ministry  of  Finance
announced the provisions to be taken for the victims of the attacks: tax relief, providing
cheap construction materials,  importing glass  products,  moderating interest  rates  on
bank loans, easing the process of applying for bank loans and accelerating the process of
determining and compensating the material  losses.At first,  however,  the expectations
that Parliament would materialise funds were not met. Instead, the issue of compensation
became a matter of charity and turned into a donation campaign. At the end of 1957,
3,247  individuals  and  corporate  bodies  had  donated  a  total  of  6.533.856  TL  to  the
campaign (Kocabaşoğlu 2000). 
26 On 28 February 1956, the indemnity law, which aimed to reimburse the losses caused by
the events  of  6  September 1955,  was passed in the National  Assembly.  However,  the
amount assigned for compensation was only 60 million TL, and consequently the losses
were only partially compensated.18
27 Despite the promise made by Prime Minister Menderes that “he would do his best to
compensate the losses in any means,”19 foreign observers characterized the indemnities
as  “insufficient,  bureaucratic  and  late.”20 The  quick  recovery  of  the  businesses  that
suffered damage was chiefly attributed to the industriousness and adaptability of the
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minorities. The victims themselves regarded the payments not as real compensation, but
as a gesture to please the international public opinion. 
 
The first step of the judicial process: a meagre
indemnity, the usual scapegoat
28 Stating its deep concern about the events, the government initially blamed “communists”
and “treacherous provocateurs” as responsible for the uprisings.Foreign observers found
these explanations doubtful, since undesirable political activities were often labelled as
“surreptitious  communism”  by  the  government  even  though  the  actual  number  of
communists in Turkey was quite limited at the time.Besides, it was obvious that activities
of  communist  and  leftist  groups  were  being  closely  monitored  by  the  secret  police;
therefore,  it  seemed  quite  unlikely  that  they  could  have  organised  the  attacks.
Nevertheless,  on 7 September  1955,  48  persons  considered communists  by  the  Police
Department were arrested and brought in to Harbiye.21
29 The special tribunals which were established in order to ensure rapid investigation of the
attacks had already made their first interrogations on 10 September 1955.Immediately
after the uprisings, Beyoğlu Special Tribunal announced that the total amount of people
under arrest was 5,104, which they classified according to the locations and categories of
their  crimes.  The  indictments  prepared  by  the  prosecutors  of  the  special  tribunals
accused 1,886 persons of destruction, 1,622 persons for theft, 595 persons for plunder, 333
persons  for  provocation,  21  persons  for  arson,  and 3  persons  for  attacking religious
premises.22 Other charges included demonstrations against foreign countries, damaging
national  interests,  communist  propaganda,  manslaughter,  sabotage,  raiding,  rape,
insulting the government and the army, and resisting state authority.
30 However,  the  judges  rejected  some  of  the  charges  because  the  police  forces  who
performed the arrests were unable to provide the necessary evidence. In addition to this,
in  a  report  submitted  to  the  Commandership  of  Beyoğlu  Administrative  District,
magistrates complained that a considerable number of the arrested was absolutely not
involved in the events.23
31 In the weeks following the events, the Turkish government began persistently defending
the  claim  that  communists  were  responsible  for  the  attacks.  Finally,  in  the  end  of
December 1955 the suspected “communists” were released without any explanation along
with many other detainees. The court cases against the suspected communists and other
detainees continued, but they eventually resulted in favour of the defendants (Dosdoğru
1993).
 
Behind the scenes: the organisation of the riots 
32 The events of 6/7 September were planned by the Democratic Party (DP) government of
the period, and were accomplished with the participation of the Secret Service, the DP’s
local administrations and organisations guided by the state such as student unions, youth
associations, syndicates and the “Association of Turkish Cyprus” (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti -
KTC).
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33 The KTC was relatively a new organization.  According to official  explanations,  it  was
established as a national committee in August 1954 to defend the Turkish minority in
Cyprus against the United Nations and other organisations, and staged protests all over
the country with the encouragement of the National Union of Turkish Students (Milli Türk
Talebe Birliği - MTTB) and the Turkish National Federation of Students (Türkiye Milli Talebe
Federasyonu - TMTF), in addition to the press and the Organisation of Turkish National
Youth (Türkiye Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı - TMGT). Not only the majority of the executive board,
but  also  ordinary  members  in  this  newly  established  organisation  cooperated  with
members of the government, as well as with organisations guided by state or with other
state institutions. The activities of the KTC, which were particularly expected to reflect
the Turkish  public  opinion  on  the  Cyprus  issue,  were  supported  financially  by  the
government.24 Hikmet Bil, the president of the KTC, and Sedat Simavi, the owner of the
newspaper Hürriyet,  contributed a great  deal  to making the Cyprus issue a  “national
matter” through the articles they penned. 
34 Kâmil Önal, a journalist and one of the members of executive board, was simultaneously a
member  of  the  National  Security  Service  (MAH).25 He  was  assigned  to  set  up  the
Anatolian, London and Cyprus branches of the KTC by the executive board. By the end of
1954, local branches had been established in Konya, Tarsus, Mersin, İskenderun, Antakya,
Gaziantep, İzmir, Balıkesir, Mudanya and Adana, in addition to district branches in Fatih
and Karagümrük in Istanbul.26
35 The KTC had a close collaborative relationship with student and youth associations. Since
the  initiative  for  constituting  the  association  belonged  to  student  organisations,  the
majority of the founding members was comprised of TMGT and TMTF members.
36 The KTC acted together with the trade unions that were clearly in the “nationalistic line;”
this  collaboration reached a  point  where  there  was  substantial  overlap  between the
executive staffs of both institutions. For instance, Bahir Ersoy, who was the top executive
of the Union of Textile and Weaving Industry Workers, was also enlisted as an executive
member of the TMGT, and had previously participated in the initiative that resulted in
the foundation of the KTC.27
37 From August 1955 until the time the events broke out, the activities of KTC increased
remarkably.
38 While the number of local branches in İstanbul was only three until mid-August, at least
ten branches were set up in different regions of İstanbul until the attacks started on
6 September  1955.  Crucially,  the  İstanbul  and  Anatolian  branches  were  founded  by
members  of  the  DP’s  local  organisations  and  trade-union  executives.  For  example,
Serafim Sağlamel, who was the head of the DP’s Zühtüpaşa district division, was also the
head  of  the  Kadıköy  branch  of  the  KTC.  The  executive  committee  members  of  DP’s
Zühtüpaşa district division were also the top executives of the KTC’s Kadıköy branch.The
members of the Büyükçekmece, Küçükçekmece, Paşabahçe ve Beykoz branches of the
KTC were also DP members. Seyfi Lobut, who was the head of the DP’s Beykoz district
division, was also an executive member of the KTC’s Beykoz branch along with other
executives of the local DP division (Dosdoğru 1993). 
39 On 16 August 1955, Hikmet Bil, acting on a letter from the Turkish Cypriot leader Fazıl
Küçük warning that Greek Cypriots were preparing a massacre of the island’s Turkish
minority,  sent  a  letter  to  all  branches  of  the  KTC stating the  necessity  of  a  “manly
reaction” from the Turkish motherland in order to intimidate London and Athens.28 On
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4September 1955,  Hikmet  Bil  ordered Kâmil  Önal  to  have students  burn some Greek
newspapers on Taksim Square in support of the demonstration organised by the KTC’s
London branch.  Indeed,  the  university  students  Gündüz Gölönü and Hurşit  Şahsuvar
incinerated Greek newspapers in front of many members of the press.29
40 In the last week of August, Önal gave an urgent order to a printing house to prepare
20,000 placards bearing the expression “Cyprus is Turkish,” and commanded a group of
university students, including Aydın Konuralp, Hurşit Şahsuvar, Erol Çetindağ and Ekrem
Yangın, to distribute the placards to main streets and department stores two days before
the  attacks.One  day  before  the  attacks,  on  5 September  1955,  Prime  Minister  Adnan
Menderes had dinner with Hikmet Bil,  and told him that he had received a ciphered
telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who had been visiting
London for  the Cyprus Conference.  The Foreign Minister  reported that  he had faced
difficulties during the negotiations, that the terms of negotiation were hard and that
during negotiations, he would like to utter Turkish public opinion to be formed30. In other
words, the Minister was demanding more action from the mainland. 
41 Bil reported this information to the executive board of the KTC, which was convened for
an urgent meeting on the same day. In the afternoon of 6 September, after news reached
Istanbul of the bomb attack to Atatürk’s home, Önal made the following statement to the
evening copy of İstanbul Ekspres: “Eventually, we can obviously confess that we will call to
account those who dared lay hands on our sacred values.”31 While Önal was handing out
posters and copies of the İstanbul Ekspres to a crowd in front of the TMTF premises, Orhan
Birgit,  a  member  of  executive  board,  wrote  a  declaration  on  behalf  of  the  KTC
condemning the attack on Atatürk’s home and asking the people to act in solidarity and
to devote themselves to the national oath “Cyprus is Turkish, and will stay Turkish.”32
42 On 7 September 1955, police arrested 87 members of the administrative committees of the
KTC İstanbul branches along with individuals who had cooperated closely with them,
including Kâmil Önal, Hikmet Bil, Hüsamettin Canöztürk, Nedim Üsdiken, Orhan Birgit,
Hurşit Şahsuvar, Aydın Konuralp and Öztürk Canöztürk. The unification of KTC branches
was banned, and the local branches’ possessions and estates were confiscated. The alleged
reason for these precautions was that the KTC’s activities led to the attacks, and that the
association had veered from its founding principle. Indeed, the number of KTC members
among the more than 3.000 arrested was relatively high. During their period of detention,
some  of  the  leaders  of  the  KTC  and  the  MTTF  mentioned  that  they  were  given
instructions by state and official authorities to plan and participate into the attacks. A spy
hidden by the Chief Inspectorship of Security among the arrested KTC members reported
that Bil had explicitly mentioned during his detention that “Adnan Menderes himself had
given instructions and financial help for the organisation of the attacks.”33
43 Towards the end of December 1955, the 87 executive members of the KTC were released,
and a charge was filed against 17 individuals on 12 February 1956. 
44 Though the  police  reports,  which included the  testimony of  KTC and student  union
members stating that they had participated in the attacks in accordance with instructions
given by the members of government, were submitted to the court, the testimonies were
not incorporated into the indictments.  The court did not take into consideration the
participation of  administrators and ordinary members of  the DP’s  local  headquarters
while preparing the indictments, nor did it take into account the fact that Kâmil Önal had
been working for MAH.
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45 In January 1955 the court received a memorandum prepared by the First  Division of
Police  conveying the fact  that  the MAH had cooperated with Önal  in organising the
attacks, and that DP members also partook in the attacks. However, Kemal Aygün, the
General  Director  of  Police,  rejected  this  memorandum  because  it  did  not  take  into
consideration the Kominform’s activities regarding the Cyprus issue, and ordered Şevki
Mutlugil,  another member of  the MAH,  to prepare a  new memorandum.  The second
memorandum described the circumstances for  the emergence of  Kominform and the
methods  it  used,  and quoted political  brochures  of  the  organisations  confirming the
collaboration with Communist Party of Turkey (TKP).34 The investigation had apparently
disclosed that the methods utilised in the events of 6 September 1955 were those of the
Komintern. 
46 As evidence for the Komintern’s involvement in the attacks, the memorandum included
two  letters  written  by  Nazım  Hikmet,  who  had  previously  fled  to  Soviet  Union,
encouraging  Turkish  workers  in  Cyprus  to  collaborate  with  Greek  workers  to  fight
imperialist dictators on the island. Only the second memorandum constituted the formal
basis for the indictment.
47 Another indication that communists had been involved was that Kâmil Önal, the main
defendant, had collaborated with Komintern while he was in Lebanon working for the
MAH.  Önal  was  said  to  have made contacts  with communists  and persons  who held
“leftist  views”  and  utilised  these  contacts  during  the  attacks.35 Although  witness
testimonies  revealed  that  Önal’s  collaboration  with  the  MAH  continued  during  his
membership in the KTC, the court disregarded this point. It was taken for granted that
Önal’s mission in MAH had ended before he was involved with KTC, and consequently the
evidence that was burnt by students on Önal’s order could not be related to the MAH. On
this assumption, the court excluded the possibility that the MAH had participated in the
organisation of the attacks. 
48 After martial law came to an end, the trial of the 17 defendants, which had been initiated
by the military court on 12 February 1956, proceeded in a civilian court closed to the
public.36 Like the military court, the civilian court did not take into consideration the
evidence of the MAH’s participation. In fact, MAH employees participated both in the
bombing attack in Thessalonica and in announcing it in the İstanbulEkspres 6 September
1955. 
49 The night before, a bomb exploded in the garden of Turkish Consulate in Thessalonica.
According to an account given confidentially to a US Embassy staff member by a high-
ranking Turkish bureaucrat, the bombing was realised to justify the attacks in İstanbul by
an “agent-provocateur.”37 According to police investigations, the bomb, which resulted
only in some broken windows, was not actually thrown into the garden, but must have
been placed by someone among the Consulate staff. The so-called “agent provocateur”
was in fact a student named Oktay Engin. Engin was living in Thessalonica as part of
Turkish minority in Greece, and his education at the Faculty of Law was covered by a
scholarship from the Turkish government. Also a MAH member, Oktay Engin was assured
that he would be given money and a position in return for his help. With the assistance of
the  Turkish  Consulate  in  Komotini  (Gümülcine),  Engin  was  brought  to  Turkey  on
22 September 1956.38 Through the personal orders of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and
the  governor  of  İstanbul  Fahrettin  Kerim Gökay,  Engin  was  given  a  position  in  the
Municipality towards the end of 1956. After performing some additional tasks for the
MAH, he became first a provincial governor, then a governor in Nevşehir.39
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50 On the surface, the events of 6 September were caused by the news of a bomb attack on
the house where Atatürk was born, a story that surfaced only in the boulevard newspaper
İstanbul Ekspres, which was printed in extraordinary numbers that day. The editor of this
newspaper, Mithat Perin, who was also known to have close connections with the DP, was
arrested after the uprisings but released two hours later on the order given by Prime
Minister Menderes personally. The fact that Perin had collaborated with the MAH became
obvious when he addressed a letter to the organisation in 1960 (Yalçın 2002). In his letter,
Perin listed the missions he had performed for the MAH, and requested financial support
for his newspaper İstanbul Ekspres.
51 Gökşin Sipahioğlu, the editor of the İstanbul Ekspres at that time, explained in an interview
that the events of 6 September 1955 were organised by the MAH. Sipahioğlu’s account was
confirmed  by  a  brigadier  general  in  an  interview  conducted  in  1991  regarding  the
structure and working principles of Special Operations: 
“The attacks of 6/7 September were certainly planned by the Special Operations
Unit. It was an extremely premeditated operation and it accomplished its objective.
Let me ask you; wasn’t it an extraordinarily successful action?”40
52 In a hearing on 24 January 1957, the judges of Criminal Court No. 1 decided to release the
defendants.  The  prosecutor  demanded  the  release  on  the  grounds  that  Cyprus  is
historically a Turkish island and is only a few of sea miles from the motherland, and that
the provocative actions against Turks in Greece and Cyprus caused the events to break
out. The prosecutor’s demand of acquittal was approved by the court on the grounds that
it was impossible for the court to produce a fair verdict based on the evidence provided
by police investigations, the trials at the Court of Martial Law and the Civilian Court or
through  the  witness  testimonies.  Moreover,  the  defendants  did  not  have  criminal
intentions. The judges then acquitted the accused of all charges by unanimous vote. 41
53 According to reports prepared by German and British Consulates-General in İstanbul,
from  the  government’s  side  at  least  President  Celal  Bayar,  Prime  Minister  Adnan
Menderes, Minister of Interior Namık Gedik, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu
and  governor  of  İstanbul  Fahrettin  Kerim  Gökay  partook  in  the  preparation  of  the
attacks;  their aim was,  first of all,  to create a pressure over London Conference,  and
secondly to direct attention away from the domestic political problems.42 However, the
foreign observers also agreed that the government was surprised by the extent of the
damage caused by the events. 
54 After the coup d’état in May 1960, President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Zorlu and Minister Köprülü were tried at the military tribunal on Yassıada
Island, and among other charges were the events of 6 September 1955. The defendants
were accused of violating the constitutionally guaranteed citizenship rights of the Greek-
Orthodox minority and of provoking Turkish citizens into demonstration and violence.43
The courts at both İstanbul and Yassıada were given evidence that the attacks had been
initiated by the government with the collaboration of  the secret  service and the DP
administration, and that various state-sponsored associations such as student and youth
organisations,  trade  unions  and  the  KTC  had  mobilised  the  participants,  but  this
partnership was not taken into consideration during the preparation of  the verdicts.
During the hearings in İstanbul between 1956 and 1957, the role of DP members, the
leaders of government, and the MAH was overlooked in order to conceal the fact that the
Turkish state was responsible for the attacks. Though the KTC was charged, its executive
boards were acquitted from all accusations, probably because they threatened to reveal
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the  responsibility  of  the  members  of  government  if  sentenced.  The  hearings  at  the
military  tribunal  on  Yassıada,  on the  other  hand,  attempted  to  prove  that  only
government members were responsible for the acts of violence,  thus legitimising the
military invention in 1960. The intermingling of the KTC, MAH, trade unions and student
associations was ignored. The innocence of KTC members was accepted as “verified” by
the Court of Martial Law in 1957. The MAH was still part of the military structure in 1960;
thus, pressing charges against MAH staff might also have brought accusations against the
officers of  the military regime.  Probably for this  reason,  the court  openly rejected a
number  of  requests  by  attorneys  to  arrange  hearings  for  MAH  administrators  or
executives, on the grounds that “the MAH’s responsibility was already clarified with the
memorandum prepared in 1956.”44 In this way, members of the Democratic Party were
presented as exclusively responsible for organising and operating the attacks. As a result,
the İstanbul and Yassıada hearings actually served to legitimise the political regimes of
1955 and 1960 instead of clarifying the Events of 6/7 September.
55 The Events of  6/7 September 1955 caused extensive disappointment with the Turkish
Republic among non-Muslims. When the of Democratic Party was established in 1945 and
the single party regime of  Republican People’s  Party (CHP) came to an end with the
transition to a multi-party regime, it was expected that the policies towards minorities
would be  liberalised in  parallel  with the democratisation of  country.  Indeed,  certain
discriminatory treatments against minorities were abolished in this new political era.
Another important reason was the struggle that the CHP, now in opposition, waged to
acquire votes. With the transition to a multi-party regime, it became critical to secure the
votes of non-Muslim minorities, who constituted nearly a third of all voters in İstanbul. 
56 As a consequence of Democratic Party’s election victory in spring 1950, the non-Muslim
minorities hoped that the liberal policies of the new government would also usher in a
democratic approach towards minorities of the country. Some of the steps taken by DP
did in fact reveal a considerably more tolerant approach to minority groups. However,
the happy atmosphere between minorities and the government quickly soured when it
turned out that the DP’s view of minorities was not all that different from the CHP’s. Non-
Muslim minorities began to be treated as secondary citizens, as had been the case in the
Ottoman past. The DP’s liberal minority policy since 1950 proved to be an impression
created by the party’s foreign policy tactics. Finally, the intensification of disputes over
Cyprus in 1954 brought a complete end to the DP government’s goodwill toward non-
Muslim minorities. 
57 The widespread assumption in the scholarly literature that the events of 6/7 September
were exclusively related to Cyprus issue is misleading. The crisis on Cyprus was more of a
“constructed” development that  contributed to the deportation process of  minorities
since 1920s. Like the Thracian Jews in 1934, non-Muslim minorities were forced to leave
the country as a result of the destruction of their movable and immovable possessions.
The  CHP’s  policy  of  cleansing  Anatolian  towns  of  Christians  and  Jews  and  amassing
minorities  in  the  few  metropolises  of  the  country  –primarily  in  İstanbul–  was
accomplished before the 1950s. Following this, as is mentioned in a report prepared in
1946, the process that would purge İstanbul of Jews and Christians was to be completed.45
If it is kept in mind that only slightly more than half of all ruined businesses belonged to
Greek-Orthodox, it is difficult to explain the acts of violence as retaliation towards Cyprus
policy of Greece.
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58 The attacks in 1955 should be considered in the context of the political and financial
difficulties  that  the Menderes government was experiencing at  the time.  In order to
prevent negative reactions from the opposition and the press, the government adopted a
hostile  stance,  in  turn  alienating  the  educated  segments  of  society.  The  events  of
6/7 September became an excuse for the government to limit the freedom of the press,
the opposition and student movement, and for keeping domestic political developments
under  control.  Immediately  after  the  attacks,  on  7 September  1955,  martial  law was
promulgated in Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir for six months, and the National Assembly was
temporarily closed down. However, according to report prepared by German Consulate
General, the government decided as early as 24 August 1955, that is, 15 days prior to the
outbreak of attacks, to initiate martial law for a year with the purpose of restraining the
activities  of  the  opposition.46 On  7  June  1956,  two  distinct  drafts  prepared  by  the
government in order to silence criticism from the Ankara and İstanbul press were passed
by the Grand National Assembly. The DP justified the bills by claiming that exaggerated
representations of news such as the bomb attack on Atatürk’s home “could depress the
country and promote crime.”47
 
The interaction between the 6-7 September Riots and
the Cyprus Issue
59 Undoubtedly, one of the surprising findings of this study is the contribution of the British
government to the preparation of the events of 6/7 September. After the Greek-Orthodox
majority in Cyprus proclaimed the goal of enosis, that is, of annexing Cyprus to the Greek
mainland,  the  British  imperial  administration  decided  to  organise  a  three-party
conference in London from 29 August to 7 September 1955.  The British government’s
rationale was to prevent Greece from bringing the Cyprus issue to the United Nations, to
ease  the  increasing  tension  between  ethnic  groups  on  the  island  and  to  strengthen
Turkey’s  position  in  order  to  preclude  criticism  of  Britain’s  colonialism  (Holland
1998).Above all, London endeavoured to convince Greeks that Turkey also had a rightful
claim to Cyprus. The British knew that their position at the conference, and later during
the probable negotiations in United Nations, would be reinforced “as long as Turks were
awakened from their own passivity” (Nicolet 2001: 59).
60 Subsequently, Macmillan informed the Turkish Foreign Ministry that he would like meet
with them prior to the conference, and stated that “if Turks put their claims as sharply as
they can at the beginning of negotiations, that would be beneficial both for them and us.”
(Holland 1998: 69). Thus encouraged, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü
Zorlu  presented  his  government’s  view  in  an  unusually  firm  manner.  The  Greek
delegation  did  not  disguise  their bewilderment  about  the  “Turkish  element”  in  the
Cyprus  issue,  and  they  held  the  British  government  accountable  for  Zorlu’s  severe
approach.48 The only development that prevented the delegates from leaving London was
the suggestion made by Macmillan that the conference should be carried on bilaterally. 
61 The conference in London collapsed because of the attacks in İstanbul, İzmir and Ankara
on  6 September  1955.  Not  aware  of  the  conspiracy  plotted  by  the  Turks,  the  Greek
Minister of  Foreign Affairs  apologised for the bomb attack in Thessalonica;  however,
Zorlu blamed the Greeks,  arguing that their provocative Cyprus policy caused to the
attacks.  The  Turkish  delegation  was  called  back  by  Menderes,  and  left  London  on
Riots against the Non-Muslims of Turkey: 6/7 September 1955 in the context of...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 12 | 2011
12
8 September 1955. The British responses to the attacks were diverse. While the British
Consulate General Mihalis Stewart called the attacks the “apex of barbarism,”49 other
members of the British Foreign Ministry were pleased with the Turkish approach of “an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”50 Yet another group among the British was pleased
with the burning of a Greek-Orthodox church because it eliminated “an unpleasant view.”
51 The  most  remarkable  response  was  that  of  the  British Minister  of  Foreign Affairs
Macmillan; although his colleagues and the British Ambassador in Ankara recommended
that he issue a stern warning to Ankara, he preferred a milder protest.52
62 The charges  by  Greeks  that  the  British had participated in  preparing the  attacks  in
İstanbul should also be considered in this context.  Immediately after the attacks,  the
Greek press held the British government accountable for the events of 6 September 1955.
63 Even official Greek authorities considered the bomb attack in Thessalonica the doing of
British intelligence agents. Though the Greek accusations seem figments of imagination,
there are indications that British were involved in the events. For instance, the British
Ambassador in Athens had already in August 1954 foreseen the possibility that an event
at Atatürk’s parental home would lead to deterioration in Turco-Greek relations:
“I think Turks started to be concerned about the situation. When I saw my Turkish
colleague,  who is  also a close friend of mine,  he explained that he was worried
about the way things are going. As I mentioned in my message, the relations are not
favourable  and  it  is  obvious  that  seemingly  friendly  Turco-Greek  relations  are
indeed fragile, even a slightest shock can be enough. It would be sufficient to incite
a turmoil through an unimportant event such as inscribing a slogan with a piece
chalk on the wall of the house where Atatürk was born.”53
64 In his memoirs published later, Prime Minister Anthony Eden confessed that the only
crucial matter for British government during London Conference was to make known the
disagreement between Turkey and Greece that they had already acknowledged in the
international arena. Moreover, a functionary of the British Foreign Ministry stated that
“If some revolts take place in Ankara that will suit our interest” (Holland 1993).
65 Shortly after the attacks in Turkey, the British Foreign Ministry ordered the News Office
to avoid emphasising news related the destruction of British commodities and injuries
caused to British nationals, especially in the press.54 The existence of such an instruction
strengthens the view that the British government provoked Turks into preparing the
attacks. 
66  The demand to reimburse the losses suffered by British nationals was withdrawn because
of political decisions made by the British Foreign Ministry. As a result, the movement
against minorities in İstanbul reinforced the position of Britain.
67 As consequence of the events, Turkey was clearly incorporated into the Cyprus conflict as
a third power. Therefore, the continuity of the status quo, that is, the permanence of
British domination over the island, became more probable. Another advantage that the
events of 6/7 September provided for Britain was that the USA changed its Cyprus policy
in the aftermath of the attacks.
68 When Greece announced that it would bring the Cyprus conflict to the United Nations
again in the spring of 1955, the US government tended to support Greek claims. The US
Ambassador to the United Nations Henry C.  Lodge’s  anti-colonial  opinions were well
known  by  British  government.  Prior  to  the  London  Conference,  the  United  States
moderated  its  position  on  the  Cyprus  issue.  A  week  before  three-party-conference,
Americans  were  still  anticipating that  an agreement among the  three  powers  would
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prevent the Greeks from bringing the issue to the United Nations. If the United States
refused the Greeks  recourse to  the United Nations,  it  would be giving up one of  its
political principles, which in turn would amount to rejecting an ally’s wish to negotiate
its claim in the United Nations. 
69 On 23 September 1955,  the United States  voted in the UN General  Assembly against
including the Cyprus issue on the UN agenda. The United States based its rejection on the
comparative significance of threats to the liberal world order and of maintaining unity
within NATO. Thus the British government eventually achieved its goal of preventing the
Cyprus issue from being debated in the United Nations. The functionaries of the British
Foreign Ministry were aware that the “ambitious approach of Greece in the UN” could be
handled easily with “the active support of USA” and they received that support as a result
of the attacks.55
70 In conclusion, let us examine whether the events of 1955 were a case of demographic
engineering. The answer is affirmative for two reasons. The first is the fact that the riots
both directly and indirectly provoked the non-Muslim population of  Istanbul  (Greek-
Orthodox,  Armenians  and  Jews)  to  migrate  from  the  country.  Although  the  Greek
patriarchate and the Greek consulate in Istanbul tried to prevent migration, we know
that in one year after the riots 5,000 young men migrated to Greece. The number of
Greek-speaking residents was reduced from 79,691 in 1955 to 65,139 in 1960. Between
1955 and 1960, 10,000 Jews left Istanbul for Israel. The British consulate reported a sudden
increase of visa applications from non-Muslim minorities after the riots.
71 The second reason for considering the events of 1955 a case of demographic engineering
lies in the definition of the concept as “any deliberate state program or policy originating
from  religious/ethnic  discrimination  or  initiated  for  political  reasons  which  aim  to
increase  the  political  and  economic  power  of  one  ethnic  group  over  others  by
manipulating population through various methods.” This was obviously the case in 1955:
a deliberately planned manipulation caused the riots, which subsequently escaped the
control  of  the  organizers.For  a  majority  of  the  non-Muslim residents,  the  events  of
6/7 September was evidence that they were not recognized as Turkish citizens. The belief
that they would be subject to discrimination in the future regardless of the political party
in power strengthened their motive to emigrate. The developments after 1955 thus also
signal the end of religious pluralism in Istanbul.
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RÉSUMÉS
A proper analysis of the Events of 6/7 September requires taking into account the ethnic and
religious  homogenization practices  of  the  Kemalist  elite,  the  exceptional  of  democratic  and
financial circumstances of the 1950s and the Cyprus conflict. Furthermore, the events should be
seen in connection to the concept of demographic engineering, defined as any deliberate state
program  or  policy  originating  from  religious/ethnic  discrimination  or  initiated  for  political
reasons which aim to increase the political and economic power of one ethnic group over others
by  manipulating  population  through  various  methods.  Under  the  circumstances,  could  the
events of 1955 be defined as a such case of demographic engineering?
In order to answer to this question, this paper analyses the political circumstances in Turkey in
the 1950s as a continuation of the 1930s and 1940s, and evaluates the “Events of 6/7 September”
in 1955 in the context of the nationalization and homogenization of the economic sphere. It then
focuses on the following judicial process, and finally on the planning of the riots, emphasizing
the roles of different actors in organising the riots. 
INDEX
Mots-clés : Chypre, émeutes, ingénierie démographique, Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti – KTC,
minorités non-musulmanes
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